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Constitutional Test of the Closed Panel Prohibition.
On February 3, 1976, the Student Government of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill submitted its plan to establish a prepaid legal services
program for the 19,000 members of its student body to the North Carolina Bar
Council with a request for approval.' North Carolina General Statute §84-
23. 1(b) requires that "plans providing for prepaid legal services must be sub-
mitted to the council and may not be implemented or operated without prior and
continuing approval." 2 Upon receipt of the plan, B.E. James, the Secretary of the
North Carolina State Bar, forwarded it to Beverly C. Moore, Chairman of the
Bar's Prepaid Legal Services Committee, and to R. W. Hutchins, President of
the North Carolina Prepaid Legal Services Corporation, for approval) Mr.
Moore prophetically responded with these concluding remarks: "I talked to
some of the consumer people in Philadelphia last weekend and if we turn down
the University of North Carolina plan, which I believe we must as it is presently
structured, then this may afford a test case situation for consumers concerning
the closed panel feature of the bill. Of course, we cannot control that."4 Mr.
Moore was referring to North Carolina General Statute § 84-23. 1(b), which re-
quires that the Bar Council not approve "any plan for prepaid legal services
which in any way restricts the right of the client or person receiving prepaid
legal services to select his own attorney from the actual members of the North
Carolina State Bar, or a member of any other state bar in any other state where
the claim or cause of action may arise." 5 North Carolina General Statute §84-
23. 1(e) contains language to the same effect.6
The University of North Carolina at-Chapel Hill plan was found to be in direct
violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1 (b), and consequently, on February 20,
1976 the Bar Council formally refused to approve it.7 Mr. Moore's perception of
the Bar Council's actions regarding the disapproval of the Student government's
plan became a reality on December 14, 1976, when the constitutional validity of
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23. 1(b) and (e) was challenged in Student Government,
University of North Carolina v. Council, North Carolina State Bar.8 The unpub-
I. Letter from E. William Bates, Ill, to B. E. James, Secretary of the N.C. State Bar, Feb. 2,
1976: See Bernholz, Student Legal Services at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 7
N.C. CENT. L.J. 286, 289 (1976).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
3. Letter from B. E. James, Secretary of North Carolina Bar to E. William Bates, Ill, Student
Body President, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 4, 1976.
4. Letter from Beverly C. Moore, Chairman, Prepaid Legal Services Committee of the North
Carolina State Bar to B. E. James, Secretary of the North Carolina Bar, February 19, 1976.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
6. ld. § 84-23.1(e). Section (e) reads: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this act or any
other statute or law, no plan providing for prepaid legal services shall be authorized to exist or
function in the State of North Carolina which in any way restricts or denies the client or person
receiving prepaid legal services the right to select an attorney of his own choice from the active
membership of the North Carolina State Bar, or a member of any other state bar in any other state
where the claim or cause of action may arise to represent said person or client."
7. Letter from R. W. Hutchins, President of the North Carolina Prepaid Legal Services
Corporation to B. E. James, Secretary, North Carolina State Bar, February 20, 1976.
8. No. C-C-76-346 (W.D.N.C., filed Dec. 14, 1976).
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lished decision in favor of the Student Government and its significance as to
group prepaid legal services will be examined herein.
BACKGROUND OF PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES
There appears to be an extensive confusion of terminology as to the basic
classifications of legal services arrangements. 9 The two universally recognized
classifications are prepaid legal services plans and group legal plans.' 0 The
American Bar Association has formally described prepaid legal services as "a
system in which the cost of possible legal services needed in the future is prepaid
in advance by, or on behalf of, the client who receives such assistance."" Group
legal services plans are commonly referred to as a method of legal service
delivery whereby the group furnishes, recommends or pays for attorneys to
represent the individual member.12 David Maron, the editor of "New Directions
in Legal Services" deemphasized this superficial distinction by stating, "[W]hile
'group legal services' refers to the method of delivery, and 'pre-paid' [sic] to a
funding mechanism, these two terms are often used interchangeably."'' 3 Such
plans will be referred to as "group prepaid legal services plans" for purposes of
this discussion.
Group prepaid legal services plans developed as the result of "concern over the
need for legal services, combined with their present inadequate delivery and
staggering costs.' 4 Although there has been a dramatic increase in the number
of lawyers in recent years, the use by and availability of lawyers to certain income
groups have not improved.' 5 Reasons for this nonuse include uncertainty as to
the existence of a legal problem, inability to pay for legal services, and simply not
knowing an attorney.16 This latter reason is directly related to potential clients
9. See generally, Delk, The Advent of Prepaid Legal Services in North Carolina, 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 271 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Advent]; Pfenningstorf & Kimball, Legal Services
Plans: A typology, 1976 ABF RES. J. 411, 413 [hereinafter cited as Typology]; Connally, Ethical
Considerations of Prepaid Legal Services, I I FORUM 201 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ethical
Considerations].
10. Advent, supra note 9, at 271; Ethical Considerations, supra note 9, at 20 1. Joseph C. Delk,
IIl attempts to distinguish group legal plans from prepaid legal services plans on the basis of the
source of funding. Mr. Delk states that group plans providing legal aid and assistance to indigents
are financed primarily by public funds. Prepaid plans, on the other hand, are said to require
payments to the plan made by or on behalf of the recipient of the services. Tom A. Connally does not
utilize this distinction, but defines prepaid legal services as any system by which the recipient of legal
services, or someone on his behalf, pays for legal services in whole or in part, by means of periodic
payments rather than on a "fee-for-service basis". Mr. Conally defines group legal services as any
arrangement between a lawyer or lawyers in a group of potential clients (e.g. labor union, trade
association, etc.) under which the lawyers undertake to render services for members of a group.
1I. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PREPAID LEGAL SERV., Special Report to National Conference on
Prepaid Legal Services i (1972).
12. Fisher, The Delivery of Legal Services Under Prepaid Plans, II FORUM 178, 180(1975) [here-
inafter cited as Delivery].
13. Maron, Under the Rubric of Group Legal Services, I NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES
I, 8 (April-May, 1976).
14. Advent, supra note 9, at 272.
15. Id. at 273.
16. Id.
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not knowing how to choose a lawyer. One writer has explained the development
of group prepaid legal services as follows:
All studies and surveys indicate that the greatest barrier between
lawyer and client in the great middle-income bracket is the fear of the
costs of legal services. The second largest barrier is the unfamiliarity of
the average American with lawyers and his consequent inability to
select a lawyer. The growth of group legal services in America is an
attempt to surmount these two barriers. Most group legal service plans
call for a membership charge which in effect prepays future legal serv-
ices, thus eliminating the fear of cost as a barrier. Since by definition the
group either employs or recommends the attorney, the second barrier,
namely, the lack of knowledge as to what attorney to select is also
eliminated,
National, state, and local bar associations have become increasingly active in
developing group prepaid legal services plans because of the potential economic
rewards involved, and as a reaction to external forces, such as labor unions, who
desire to offer prepaid legal services as a fringe benefit. 9 This response has also
been a result of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, examined here-
in, pertaining to the right to associate for the rendition of legal services.
There are basically two methods of attorney selection, regardless of whether
the group legal services or prepaid legal services plan is employed. These are
commonly referred to as "open panel" plans and "closed panel" plans. Some
confusion may exist as to the use of these terms, as it is impossible to designate
each plan as either open or closed, for in reality open and closed are the "two
ends of the spectrum between which many degrees of 'openness' or 'closedness'
fall."19 A completely open panel plan allows the individual to select an' licensed
attorney to handle his legal matters, while the plan pays for the services accord-
ing to a prearranged benefit schedule.2" A completely closed panel plan limits
the individual's choice to either a preselected group of attorneys, or the group
employed "house" counsel-a specific lawyer, or lawyers, who has been con-
tracted by an organization, such as a union, consumer group, or student group,
to provide legal services to members of the group for a specified fee. 2'
The principal alleged advantage to the consumer of legal services of an open
panel plan is that it allows a group member to select an attorney of his choice
without restrictions, except as to the amount which the plan will pay the attor-
ney for his services to the group member.22 The fact of this third-party fee pay-
ment arrangement may tempt subscribers into overutilizing benefits and induce
17. Deliver', supra note 12, at 180.
18. Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Prepaid Legal Services Plans, 1976 ABF RES. J. 855. 857 [here-
inafter cited as Antitrust Aspects].
19. Note, State Prohibition of Closed Panels- The Constitutional Question, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
590 (1975) [hereinafter cited as State Prohibition].
20. See. e.g.. State Prohibition, Supra note 19, at 590; Ethical Considerations, supra note 9, at
201-02.
21. Id.
22. Advent. supra note 9, at 277.
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lawyers to adjust fees upward or quality downward, or to provide services that
are unnecessary. 23 It is inherently apparent that this type of legal services deli-
very may tend to be expensive and inefficient. Projections of utilization by the
group members must be made in order to estimate the budgetary allocations
needed by the plan, and a sufficient amount of finances must be kept in reserve to
provide for any unanticipated demand or expensive litigation.
Proponents of open panel group prepaid legal services plans applaud the
freedom of choice afforded group members under this type of attorney selection
arrangement. Clients select their attorneys individually in the traditional man-
ner without guidance other than the advice of relatives, friends, or colleagues. 24
Thus, the problems of finding and selecting a competent lawyer are the same as
for other citizens who employ lawyers individully. 25 The basic reason for advo-
cating freedom of choice in the selection of attorneys is the belief that such a sys-
tem helps to assure the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and the
quality of legal services provided to the individual clients.26 Freedom of choice
may not be as extensive under open panel plans as contended. Open panel plans
rely upon attorneys in the community accepting employment and participating
in the plan. Whether such a plan offers its beneficiaries a meaningful freedom of
choice depends upon the number and professional qualifications of these par-
ticipating attorneys.2 7 Also, a certain freedom may exist in one's not having to
choose an attorney-knowing that the firm which handles the legal work for the
group is staffed by carefully screened, competent attorneys, specializing in the
area of the group's need. 28
Closed panel plans have been used by labor unions and similar consumer
groups, such as students, because they are considered to be more economical
than open panel plans, and because it is believed that group members, owing to a
lack of information and a traditional distrust of lawyers, prefer delegating the
selection of lawyers to trusted group leaders. 29 Cost reduction is an important
aspect of closed panel group prepaid legal services. Attorneys are likely to offer
more legal services coverage to a group at a lower premium under a closed
panel plan. This is because attorneys, under the closed panel plan, can count on
receiving a certain sum as yearly retainer from a group in exchange for
providing services for a relatively predictable number of cases each year.30
By reason of the predictability of the types of services which will be required, the
closed panel attorney is in a better position to utilize paraprofessionals, auto-
23. Pfenningstorf & Kimball, Regulation of Legal Services Plans, 1977 ABF RES. J. 357,411
[hereinfater cited as Regulation].
24. Id.
25. The examination of the problems inherent in the traditional selection of attorneys by indi-
vidual clients is beyond the purview of this discussion.
26. Cole, Freedom of Choice and Group Legal Services, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 675 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Freedom of Choice].
27. Ttpology, supra note 9, at 466.
28. Note, Prepaid Legal Services: More than an Open and Closed Case, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
425, 437 (1973).
29. Regulation, supra note 23, at 409.
30. Baron & Cole, Real Freedom of Choicefor the Consumer of Legal Services: Mr. Doole 'and
the Closed Panel Option, 58 MASS. L. Q. 253, 257 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Real Freedom].
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mation mechanization, and specialists, thus producing greater efficiency, re-
duced costs, and increased quality of services. 31 The long-term experience of
the attorney with the group under a closed panel plan permits the attorney to
develop expertise in relevant areas, to conduct group educational programs,
and to engage in preventive law projects. 32 Thus, the cost of legal services can
be reduced as the closed panel attorney utilizes his expertise to develop efficient
procedures for dealing with frequently recurring group problems.
Delegating the selection of an attorney to group administrators is a
more rational method of selecting an attorney than the traditional pattern of
following the advice of unqualified individuals. 33 In open panel plans, a poten-
tial client runs the risk of selecting an incompetent attorney, while under the
closed panel plan, the screening process insures an informed and rational
choice by the group. 34 The client may feel a greater confidence in the quality of
legal services which he receives if he knows that the group to which he belongs
has retained confidence in the lawyers on the basis of long-term experience with
them.35 Though the closed panel plan may offer little freedom of choice to the
group members, it poses fewer selection problems than the open panel.
THE COURT'S VIEW
Prior to 1963 the courts had generally barred group legal services, usually
on the ground they constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 36 The court
decisions holding group legal services unconstitutional were all based on the
proposition that the corporations or associations were practicing law. 37 The
Supreme Court of the United States examined the concept of group legal servi-
ices in the 1960's and early 1970's, striking down the Bar's heretofore condem-
nation of group legal services. 38 NAACP v. Button,39 decided in 1963, marked
the Court's willingness to intervene in the area of group legal services. The
NAACP had brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a Virginia statute which
precluded it from providing attorneys to its members or the other persons who
desired to litigate racial discrimination issues. 40 In striking down the Virginia
statute as in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion, the Court held that the activities of the NAACP in providing attorneys to
its members were modes of "expression" and "association", protected by the first
31. Dunne, Prepaid Legal Services Have Arrived, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 24 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Arrived].
32. See Real Freedom, supra note 30, at 258; W. PFENNINGSTORF & S. KIMBALL, LEGAL SERVICE
PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGULATION 339 (1977) [hereinafter cited as APPROACHES]; Typology, supra
note 9, at 420.
33. Regulation, supra note 23, at 417.
34. Arrived, supra note 31, at 24.
35. Real Freedom, supra note 30, at 257.
36. Delivery, supra note 12, at 181.
37. Id.
38. State Prohibition, supra note 19, at 591.
39. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
40. Id.
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and fourteenth amendments, which Virginia could not prohibit as an improper
solicitation of legal business under its power to regulate the legal profession."
A year later in the case of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex
rel, Virginia State Bar, 42 the Court upheld a union activity, which was basically a
referral service, in which injured members were advised of their need of legal
counsel and referred to lawyers selected by the union. The Court held that the
first and fourteenth amendments protected the activities of the Brotherhood in
securing legal representation of its members, and that under the traditional "bal-
ancing test" used in Button, the state had failed to demonstrate a compelling
state interest in its regulation of these constitutionally protected rights.43 Al-
though no civil rights were involved in Brotherhood as in the Button decision,
the Court demonstrated its inclination in the direction of the acceptability of
group legal services. The Court had signified a trend toward the inability of
ethical considerations to inhibit a litigant's right to associate to secure com-
mon goals. 44
The Court continued to expand the Button and Brotherhood doctrines in the
subsequent case of United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association.4 5 The
union's plan in UMW was essentially a closed panel plan whereby the union
employed attorneys on a salaried basis to assist and represent union members
with their claims to workmen's compensation. The Court rejected the contention
that this plan represented the unauthorized practice of law, and reversed the in-
juction against the union continuing its plan: "We hold that the freedom of
speech, assembly and petition guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salaried basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights. '46 The Court refused to distinguish
UMW from Button or Brotherhood on the basis of the union's plan not being
"political expression" or a "referral service", respectively. 47 The state had failed
again to establish a compelling state interest sufficient to overcome the protec-
tion of the union's fundamental right to hire an attorney under reasonable terms
and conditions. The Court also held that the mere potentiality of threat to the
attorney-client relationship was an insufficient basis for a state to interfere with
the operation of a group legal services plan. 48
The most recent Supreme Court endorsement of a group legal services plan
was found in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan.4 9 The
union had initiated a program to refer its members to selected attorneys with
whom the union had secured commitments as to the fees to be charged. In over-
41. Id. at 428.
42. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
43. Id. At 6.
44. State Prohibition, supra note 19, at 594.
45. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
46. Id. at 221-22.
47. kd. at 223-24.
48. fd. at 222-25.
49. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
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turning the injunction granted in the lower Michigan court against the union's
implementation of its plan, the Court held that "upholding the first amendment
principle that groups can unite to assert their legal rights as efficiently and
economically as practicable," the injunction here is a forbidden restraint on
these first amendment rights. 50 The Bar had failed to demonstrate an interest
sufficient to overcome the constitutional protection afforded the union's
fundamental right to associate to obtain access to the courts; but again, the
Court left open the possibility of such a compelling state interest.5' The Court
attempted to synthesize the law in the area of group legal services as follows:
At issue is the basic right to group legal action, a right first asserted in
this court by an association of Negroes seeking the protection of free-
doms guaranteed by the Constitution. The common thread running
through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United
Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaning-
ful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of
the First Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if
courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of en-
abling their members to meet the costs of legal representation. 52
The Court clearly established the right of a group to procure legal services, but
did little to resolve the conflict between closed and open panel advocates over
the interpretation of what constitutes "meaningful access."
BAR AND STATE REACTION
The organized Bar was not prepared to give full and unqualified endorsement
to the group legal services concept, as was the United States Supreme Court.5 3
The Bar's reluctance was based on its concern that group legal services would
detrimentally affect the general practitioner.5 4 This concern resulted in the adop-
tion by the American Bar Association House of Delegates of the infamous
"Houston Amendments," allowing for the different treatment of open and
closed panel plans. 55 The amendments required that a closed plan be non-profit,
that the rendition of legal services be its primary purpose, and that there not be
any profit derived from the rendition of legal services to the benefit of the or-
ganization sponsoring the plan.5 6 The A.B.A.'s preference for the open panel
plan is best exemplified by the requirement in the Houston Amendments that
any closed panel plan contain an "opt-out" provision, thereby giving the benefi-
50. Id. at 580.
51. Id. at 584.
52. Id. at 585-86.
53. Advent, supra note 9, at 277.
54. Id.
55. House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges Redefinition of Rape, and Undoes the Houston
Amendments, 61 AM. BAR. Assoc. J. 463, 465 (1975).
56. House of Delegates Acts on Group Legal Services, Shield Legislation, Court Organization
Standards and Uniform Divorce, 60 AM. BAR Assoc. J. 466, 448 (1974).
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ciary of the plan an option to use the group's attorneys or, to select counsel out-
side the plan, for which the plan must provide reimbursement. 57
Adoption of the opt-out provision slowed commencement of new group legal
service plans, since the task of predicting controllable costs at a reduced rate was
thereby made more speculative.5 The additional restriction of the opt-out pro-
vision in closed plans raised the ire of closed panel advocates, and was severely
criticized by spokesmen for consumer groups. 59 On May 14, 1974, the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Subcommitte on Representation of Citizens Interests opened
hearings on prepaid legal services plans and the proposed "Houston Amend-
ments." 601 The subcommitte was chaired by Senator John Tunney of Cali-
fornia.6' In the two days of hearings, a recurrent theme was the need for both
types of legal services plans, open and closed.62 Senator Tunney summed up his
own opinion about the cost-choice relationship of closed panel-open panel
arrangements as follows: "I therefore think it is possible for both plans to thrive.
I do not know why there is the desire on the part of some to destroy-the closed
panel plans."6 13
The A.B.A. was faced with a dilemma: closed panel plans afforded the best
opportunity for the Bar to meet the legal needs of middle income Americans at a
low cost, but posed the biggest threat to established ethical standards, which
standards must be upheld in order to maintain the integrity of the legal profes-
sion. 64 The A.B.A. reevaluated its position, and at its mid-winter meeting in
1975, adopted several changes to the Code of Professional Responsibility which
eliminated the distinction between open and closed panel plans for group pre-
paid legal services.65
North Carolina was not immune to the national controversy surrounding
group prepaid legal services. In 1975, the North Carolina General Assembly
amended Chapter 84 of the General Statutes to provide for the approval and
supervision of prepaid plans by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar. 66
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1(b) places all nonprofit legal service plans under
the supervision of the North Carolina State Bar. 67 In addition to empowering
the North Carolina State Bar to create a nonprofit corporation pursuant to
57. Ethical Considerations, supra note 9, at 202.
58. Id.
59. Morrison, Bar Ethics: Barrier to the Consumer, II TRIAL 14 (1974).
60. Note. Legal Services Within Reach of the A verage American: A Review of the Tunney' Hear-
ings, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 603 (1975); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizens
Interests of the Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Advent, supra note 9,
at 277.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 212 (testimony of J. Wilson);Id. at 14 (testimony of L. Woodcock); Id. at 141
(testimony of the A.B.A. Special Committee).
63. Id. at 210 (testimony of Sen. J. Tunney).
64. Ethical Considerations, supra note 9, at 202.
65. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(d) (5); Advent, supra note 9,
at 278. North Carolina has not adopted the new provisions of the ABA Code into its Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, but the present provisions of Disciplinary Rule 2-103(d) (5) do not prohibit
closed panel plans. See NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(d) (5).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
67. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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Chapter 55A of the General Statutes for the purpose of providing for prepay-
ment of legal services, 68 the Council has the express authority to approve plans
for prepaid legal services unconnected with this corporation. 69
The significance of N.C. GEN. STAT. §84-23.1 to this discussion is its treatment
of open and closed panel group prepaid legal services plans. Although the terms
open and closed panels are not specifically used in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23. 1(b)
and (e), these sections effectively forbid the approval and therefore, the opera-
tion of any closed panel legal services plan in the State of North Carolina.7 0 The
issue of permitting closed panel plans was rigorously studied by the Special
Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, appointed by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar of April 24, 1973, which recommended that only open panel
plans be permitted for bar-sponsored programs.7' As originally introduced on
behalf of the North Carolina State Bar, the bill did not contain the prohibition
against closed plans.7 2 The amendment to prohibit closed plans, which was ap-
proved and became a part of the bill, was introduced by Representative R. C.
Soles Jr., after the bill had been referred to a legislative committee of the North
Carolina House of Representatives. 73 Mr. Soles intended that his amendment
prohibit closed panel plans, because he felt that "if you paid your fees for legal
services, you should be able to choose any attorney you want." 74 Thus, there
never was a great deal of controversy over whether a closed panel plan would be
prohibited by the North Carolina State Bar Council. The difficulty arose as to
the determination of what constituted a closed panel plan. 75
THE TEST CASE
As of the date of the submission of the University of North Carolina-Chapel
Hill plan, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23.1 (b) and (e) had not been applied to prohibit
any closed panel plans, "although a reading of the language implies that a closed
panel plan which does not reimburse those beneficiaries wishing to 'opt-out' of
the services of the retained panel attorney would be prohibited. 76 The plan sub-
mitted by the Student Government was closed panel instead of open, because
William Bates, the Student Government President at the time, determined that
the closed panel method of delivery of legal services provided significant op-
portunities for cost savings unavailable under an open panel plan.77 The closed
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23. l(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The North Carolina Prepaid Legal Services
Corporation is beyond the purview of this discussion. See generally, Advent, supra note 9.
69. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 5 supra and accompanying text; See note 6 supra.
71. Advent, supra note 9, at 287.
72. See note 8 supra (Stipulation and Production of Documents, filed May 3, 1977).
73. Id.
74. Telephone interview with R. C. Soles, Jr., Representative, North Carolina House of Repre-
sentatives, March 21, 1978.
75. See note 7 supra; Letter from B. E. James, Secretary of North Carolina Bar to R. W. Hut-
chins, President of the North Carolina Prepaid Legal Services Corporation, February 17, 1976.
76. Bernholz, Student Legal Services at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 7 N.C.
CENT. L. J. 286, 292 (1976).
77. Id.
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panel plan was submitted with the hope that the North Carolina State Bar would
loosely apply N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23. 1(b) and (e), and find the plan in compli-
ance with the statutory requirements.7 8 The closed panel plan that was submitted
would have limited each student at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
in his or her attorney selection to the selection of attorneys on the staff of the
plan.79 No student would have been precluded from choosing his or her own
attorney, but the plan would not have paid for such retention. 80
Upon notification of the Bar Council's refusal to approve the plan," the Stu-
dent Government contemplated the amendment of its plan to include an opt-out
feature, under which members of the plan could select any attorney of their
choice and receive reimbursement. 82 At this particular juncture, the alternative
of a court test of the constitutional validity of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23.1 (b) and
(e) was determined not in the student's best interest because it would further
delay legal services to students at great expense. 83 The students felt that the re-
quirement by the state of an opt-out provision not only added uncertainty to
estimates of utilization and predictions of the number of participating attorneys
needed, but in addition added unpredictable program costs. 84 Due to the con-
siderations of time and cost of litigation, the Student Government resubmitted a
plan containing the opt-out feature in the hope that the majority of students
would not elect to utilize the opt-out feature in preference to the on-campus
attorney. 85 That plan was approved by the Bar Council on April 16, 1976.86
The effect of the rejection of the Student Government's closed panel plan was
to raise the cost of the plan and to decrease the legal services which could be of-
fered to students. In the first 16 months of operation of the plan, none of the
students opted for private attorneys. 87 Because students might use the option,
the program had to set aside approximately $2,800 of its limited budget of
$20,000.88 This reserve could have been used for preventive law workshops, legal
educational programs and legal problems common to university students.
Rejection of the closed panel plan created these budgetary considerations, and
prevented the Student Government from conducting desired aspects of its legal
services plan.89 The attorney hired by the Student Government also faced the
possibility that her salary would be reduced because of the necessity for pay-
ments to outside attorneys pursuant to the opt-out feature required by the Bar
Council. 90
78. Id.
79. See note 8 supra (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed Aug. 10, 1977).
80. Id.
81. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
82. Bernholz, supra note 75, at 293.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 294.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The Charlotte Observer, Aug. II, 1977 § B, at 2, Col. 1-2.
88. Id.
89. See note 8 supra (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed Jan. 20, 1977).
90. Id.
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The Student Government made the determination that it could successfully
challenge the constitutionality of the prohibition of closed panel plans found in
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23. 1(b) and (e), and on December 14, 1976, filed their
complaint.91 Plaintiffs in the action were the Student Government of the Univer-
sity of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; Leland C. Barbour, a student at the Uni-
versity; William 0. Richardson, a student at the University and Student Govern-
ment President; and Dorothy C, Bernholz, the on-campus students' attorney
for Student Legal Services at the University.92 Defendants in the action were
Council, North Carolina State Bar, and George J. Miller, President of the State
Bar and Chairman of the Council.93
The challenge was filed in the District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, with the honorable James B. McMillan, United States District Judge,
presiding.94 The plaintiffs requested that the Court declare North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 84-23. 1(b) and (e) unconstitutional, and enjoin the defendants
from enforcing those statutes insofar as they operated to hinder or preclude the
approval of closed panel legal service plans.95 The issue presented was whether
the State of North Carolina could prevent a group from choosing the plan which
it preferred by insisting that every panel be open rather than closed .96 The plain-
tiffs argued that on the basis of the four decisions of the United States Supreme
Court discussed previously herein, they had the right, under the first and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution, to associate together to
retain attorneys under terms and conditions of their choice, including the use of
a closed panel legal services plan.97 Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that the
provisions of North Carolina General Statutes§§ 84-23. 1(b) and (e) which limit
or preclude the approval of closed panel legal services plans were unconstitu-
tional or their face and as applied, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.98 Inter-
ference by the State of North Carolina with the right to associate and implement
a closed panel plan to provide legal ervices to the group was unconstitutional, at
least if not supported by an overwhelming state interest in infringing the free-
doms involved.99
As closed panel plans are, by definition, in direct violation of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 84-23.1(b) and (e), the state was attempting to prevent entirely the use of
closed panel group prepaid legal services plans.100 The plaintiffs argued that the
state could demonstrate no legitimate interest in limiting the right to operate a
closed panel plan. 01 The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on January 20,
91. Id. (Judgment, filed Aug. 17, 1977).
92. See note 89 supra.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Compare note 21 supra, and accompanying text with notes 5-6 supra and accompanying
text. Closed panel plans by definition limit the clients selection to a preselected attorney or group of
attorneys, thereby restricting his right to select under N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 84-23. 1(b) and (e).
101. See note 89 supra.
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1977 and filed a supporting affidavit. 02 At the hearing on all motions of the
parties, the defendants argued only that plaintiffs had failed to join all affected
parties, and moved to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, which
was decided in favor of the plaintiffs. 03 The court entered its memorandum,
dated June 27, 1977, concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled tojudgment as a
matter of law.114
The court held that "North Carolina General Statutes §§ 84-23. 1(b) and 84-
23.1 (e) are unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution insofar as those statutes hinder or pre-
vent the use of closed panel legal services plans."' 05 This judgment was based on
the conclusion of law that defendants' actions were taken in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, under color of state law and in violation of plaintiffs' rights under
the first and fourteenth amendments. 0 6 The court permanently enjoined the
"defendants, their officers, agents, and employees (including any successors
thereto)" from enforcing the statutes in question or any other similar rules,
"which by design or effect hinder or preclude plaintiffs from contracting for, or
benefiting from, or participating in, closed panel legal services programs."" 7
Attorneys' fees of $5,500 were awarded to the plaintiffs. 0 8
SIGNIFICANCE
Does the Student Government decision mean that a state may not constitu-
tionally compel the use of open panels in group legal services plans submitted
for approval in that state? The answer to this question seems to be an emphatic
"yes". This question has never been presented to the United States Supreme
Court, 09 and apparently it will never reach the highest Court in this particular
case, as the defendants have not taken an appeal." 0 What then is the current
status of group prepaid legal services?
The decision in Student Government must be viewed in light of the previous
decisions of the United States Supreme Court discussed herein. In each of the
cases-Button,"' Brotherhood,12 UMW,1 3 and UTI/14-the states were
attempting to completely prohibit group legal services, and the Court found
102. See note 8 supra, (Memorandum, filed June 28, 1977).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See note 91 supra.
106. See note 79 supra. The statutes were also said to constitute a prior restraint on the first
Amendment rights of plaintiffs and therefore in violation of the Constitution for that reason.
107. See note 91 supra.
108. Id.
109. State Prohibition, supra note 19, at 597.
110. Interview with Dorthy C. Bernholz, Attorney for Student Legal Services at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 28, 1978.
111. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
112. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
113. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
114. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
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the state's interest insufficient to substantiate a need for these regulations. 15 The
Court always left open the possibility that a legitimate and compelling state
interest might be shown to exist, especially if the prohibitions were aimed at con-
trolling conduct that produced substantial evils and injuries to the public inter-
est.116
In Student Government, the court was not confronted with such a complete
prohibition of group legal services. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1 unquestion-
ably permitted the implementation of open panel plans of group legal services.
The prohibition of closed panel plans was the focus of the amendments intro-
duced by Representative Soles.117 In the previous Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussed herein the state carried a heavy burden in attempting to demonstrate a
compelling state interest to justify the complete prohibition of group legal serv-
ices. II It is only reasonable to hypothesize that if the state limits its legislation to
narrowly-drawn statutes which seek to prevent specific injuries to the public
interest, the burden required to justify the regulation will be much less. 119
Arguably, the Bar Council did not bear as heavy a burden as the defendant
states in Button, Brotherhood, UMWand UTU.
The adoption of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-23.1 (b) and (e) was an express attempt
to provide freedom of choice to members participating in a group prepaid legal
services plan. 20 The language of the sections is even worded in terms of "restric-
tion" of freedom of choice.' 2' Apparently, the members of the legislature were
concerned that the public demanded this freedom of choice. In response to this
argument, one writer asserted:
Were groups to be prohibited from offering closed panel alterna-
tives, the public would be denied the opportunity to choose freely be-
tween open and closed panel options. If the lay public is as concerned as
the Bar thinks it should be with having freedom to choose an individual
attorney, then presumably, members of the public will opt for the open
panel plans and pass the closed panel alternatives by. But many mem-
bers of the public may feel that there are good reasons for giving the
closed panel option careful consideration....
•.. It is patently inconsistent for the bar to contend, on the one hand,
that middle-income persons are competent to choose intelligently
among the thousands of lawyers ... who might help them with a press-
ing legal problem, and to argue on the other hand, that those same per-
sons are not competent to choose between two types of legal service
plans which display differences, which are few in number and fairly
obvious.122
115. State Prohibition, supra note 19, at 596.
116. Id.
117. See note 74 supra.
118. State Prohibition, supra note 19, at 597.
119. Id.
120. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
121. See notes 5 and 6 supra. The terminology used is "restricts or denies."
122. Real Freedom, supra note 30, at 256, 258.
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The requirement of the opt-out provisions and the effective prohibition of closed
panel plans thus denies a group the right to select a plan that is wholly and en-
tirely a closed panel plan, limiting the freedom of choice of the group or indi-
vidual who desires to participate in a closed panel plan.
While this principle of free choice is often cited in support of open panel plans
and in opposition to closed panel plans, close examination reveals that the con-
cern of the advocates of open panels is less the preservation of the client's free-
dom to choose his attorney than the protection of the attorneyand the attorney-
client relationship from outside interference. 23 This concern with respect to
closed panel plans is that the insertion of an intermediary between the attorney
and client may improperly influence the attorney in the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment.124 Experience with closed panel plans around the United States
provides no evidence that these potential threats to the attorney-client relation-
ship have been realized in practice. 25 "Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
has so found and held that the presence of a mere potentiality of threat to the
attorney-client relationship is an insufficient basis for a state to interfere with the
operation of a group legal services plan."'1 26 Thus, the assertion of a legitimate
state interest in providing freedom of choice and protection of the attorney-
client relationship as a justification for the regulation and prohibition of closed
panel plans is unavailing. The Court would not view these interests as satisfying
even the lightened burden on the Bar Council in Student Government. Unless
there is a strong showing that restrictions on freedom of choice imposed by a
closed panel group prepaid legal services plan have in fact worked actual injury
upon the group's members, no state rule compelling group legal services to use
open panel plans should withstand constitutional challenge. 27
The injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in Student Government were not caused
by the restrictions on freedom of choice inherent in closed panel plans, but by the
very prohibition of the closed panel plans themselves. The budgetary limitations
imposed because of the opt-out feature interfered with the student's meaning-
ful access to the courts, denying the Student Government the means of enabling
its student members to meet the costs of legal representation. 128 The absence of
closed panel plans limits access to an attorney for many group members. 29 Since
some group members are not in a position to select attorneys on their own or to
pay the fees, a closed panel plan may be the only effective way for them to obtain
legal assistance. 30 The budget of the legal services program would have been
depleted if students had utilized the opt-out provision extensively. Students
unlucky enough to incur their legal problems after this depletion would have
been precluded from exercising their option and obtaining "meaningful access."
123. Tv-pology, supra note 9, at 466.
124. Regulation, supra note 23, at 413.
125. Real Freedom, supra note 30, at 259.
126. Id. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. at 222-25.
127. Freedom of Choice, supra note 26, at 686.
128. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. at 595-86.
129. Regulation, supra note 23, at 416.
130. Id.
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The decision in Student Government will permit the development of low cost
group prepaid legal services in North Carolina and in other states that now com-
pel the utilization of open panel plans. Although North Carolina did not attempt
to completely prohibit group legal services, and narrowly construed its restric-
tion against closed panel plans, the Supreme Court would probably have little
difficulty in upholding Judge McMillan's judgment. The Bar Council would
experience significant difficulty in demonstrating the harm suffered by clients
from third party interference. There seems to be no legitimate state interest in the
prohibition of closed panel group prepaid legal services plans sufficient tojustify
such regulation at the expense of constitutionally recognized rights.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages of each form of delivery of
legal services, in order to make legal services truly available to a large number of
people, the development of all types of prepaid legal services plans must be en-
couraged.' 3' The decision in Student Government is a step towards the elimina-
tion of the "artificial" distinction between open and closed panels that obstructs
this development. 32 It indicates that no "prophylactic" rule restricting prepaid
legal services delivery plans is justified. 133 It seems equally clear that a state so ill-
advised as to adopt such a measure subjects itself to a successful constitutional
challenge of interference with first and fourteenth amendment rights. One
author writes: "As consumers and attorneys recognize the ability of group and
prepaid legal service programs to meet the severely underserved needs of middle
and lower-middle-income people, the rules controlling attorney involvement
with these programs will undoubtedly assume a form conducive to the develop-
ment of these plans." 34 The transformation has already begun.
BARRY S. McNEILL
131. Arrived, supra note 31, at 22.
132. Sims, Current Developments, 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 1, 72 (May-June,
1977).
133. See Stoltz, Sesame Street for Law vers: A Dramatic Rendition of United Transportation
Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 36 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTIC NEWS 14 (1971).
134. Dement, Consumer Lookout, I NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES I, 15 (Sept. 1976).
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